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“Sometimes corruption is slowed by shedding light into what was
previously shadowed.”
—Paul Wolfowitz1
I. INTRODUCTION
“Arizona [is] ground zero for ‘dark money’ campaigns.”2 That line
appeared in a 2016 article in the Arizona Republic after New York
University released a study detailing the explosion of “dark money” in state
and local politics.3 That study found that Arizona saw “by far the biggest
surge in dark money”4 in the four years following the Supreme Court’s
decision in Citizens United v. FEC.5 During the 2014 election cycle,
Arizona had approximately $10.3 million in dark money coursing through
its political veins—more than any other state examined by the study.6
“Dark money” is the money spent on political campaigns from
undisclosed donors. To illustrate, suppose that Exxon wants to give $1
* Attorney, Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, PLC, Phoenix, Arizona; J.D., Sandra Day O’Connor
College of Law—Arizona State University; B.A., magna cum laude, Iowa State University.
I would like to thank Professor Paul Bender for his guidance and support while writing this
Article. I would also like to thank Laurie Roberts and Mary Jo Pitzl at the Arizona Republic
for continually following Arizona campaign finance reform and for shedding light on the
corrupting influence dark money can have on local politics. 1 Françoise Grouigneau &
Richard Hiault, An Interview With Paul Wolfowitz, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 29, 2006. Paul
Wolfowitz is the former dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
at Johns Hopkins University.
2
Laurie Roberts, Will Arizona Stand Up to Dark Money?, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 29,
2016,
available
at
http://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/oped/laurieroberts/2016/06/29/roberts-arizona-read-you-stand-up-dark-money/86493966/.
3
CHISUN LEE ET AL., SECRET SPENDING IN THE STATES (2016) (published by NYU Law
School’s Brennan Center for Justice).
4
Id. at 7.
5
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
6
Lee et al., supra note 3, at 7, 10.
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million to Senator X from Arizona because Exxon thinks Senator X will be
sympathetic to the needs of the fossil fuel industry in the Southwest.
Exxon cannot give $1 million directly to Senator X in exchange for
favorable votes—that exceeds direct campaign contribution limits and
would likely amount to quid pro quo bribery, which, for now, is still illegal.
In the post-Citizens United world, however, there are three easy ways
Exxon can use that money to get Senator X reelected: (1) it can donate to
an already-existing Political Action Committee, which will in turn spend
that money to get Senator X reelected; (2) it can set up its own Political
Action Committee, which will in turn spend that money to get Senator X
reelected; or (3) it can donate to a politically-minded 501(c)(4)
organization, which will in turn spend that money to get Senator X
reelected.
If Exxon chooses option one or two, it will be forced to disclose its
donation to Arizona’s Secretary of State, so that voters will realize—in
theory—that Senator X received large donations from an Exxon-funded
PAC. If, however, Exxon were to go with option three, it would not have
to disclose its donation. Exxon can spend $1 million to get Senator X
elected and the public would be none the wiser. This is dark money. It is
the money funneled into political campaigns by anonymous, wealthy
donors.7
Loose campaign finance regulations can result in political candidates
benefiting from enormous sums of dark money from unknown
corporations, labor unions, and wealthy individuals. For example, Arizona
Governor Doug Ducey benefited from $8.2 million in spending by dark
money groups during his 2014 campaign.8 Unsurprisingly, in 2016,
Governor Ducey signed into law Senate Bill 1516,9 which loosened state
control over anonymous campaign donations and made numerous changes
to Arizona campaign finance law.10 Governor Ducey says this law is “the
first step in simplifying our laws and regulations to provide
more opportunity for participation in the political process and increased
freedom of speech.”11 Opponents of the bill, such as Democratic State
Senator Steve Farley, believe “[i]t quashes [political] participation for
7

When I say the donors are “anonymous,” I only mean to say that the public at-large
does not know who made the donation. The politician receiving the donation is often fully
aware of the donor’s identity.
8
Mary Jo Pitzl, Arizona Gov. Doug Ducey Signs ‘Dark-Money’ Bill, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
(March
31,
2016),
available
at
http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona/2016/03/31/arizona-gov-doug-duceysigns-darkmoney-bill/82492558/.
9
See generally S.B. 1516, 52d Leg. 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2016).
10
Pitzl, supra note 8.
11
Id.
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anyone who. . .doesn’t have the ‘price of admission.’”12
In most States, little can be done to deter dark money donations. The
only recourse would be to change state law to require disclosure from
501(c)(4) organizations. However, that route is often a dead-end: why
would a politician benefiting from these tax-exempt super-donors want to
encumber his cash flow? Arizona, however, is not like most states. Under
the title “Campaign Contributions and Expenditures; Publicity,” Article 7,
§ 16 of the Arizona Constitution requires “[t]he legislature, at its first
session, [to] enact a law providing for a general publicity . . . of all
campaign contributions to, and expenditures of campaign committees and
candidates for public office.”13 I will often refer to Article 7, § 16 as the
“General Publicity Clause.”
The Arizona courts never had an opportunity to interpret this
provision. However, this is one of the many provisions in Arizona’s
Constitution designed to “ensure that the citizen’s right to cast his vote [is]
meaningful and [that] elections [are] pure.”14 It is clear from the text of the
Arizona Constitution that the framers were fearful of corruption in
government.15 And they were especially concerned about the influence
corporations could have on elections.16 Unlike most state charters,
Arizona’s Constitution makes it “unlawful for any corporation . . . to make
any contribution of money or anything of value for the purpose of
influencing any election . . . .”17
The framers, however, could not have imagined the intricacy of
today’s campaign finance laws, and they certainly could not have foreseen
the rise of dark money, emanating from tax-exempt social welfare
organizations. This is why they placed a continuing duty on the State’s
Legislature to “enact . . . law[s] providing for a general publicity. . .of all

12

Id.
Ariz. Const. art. VII, § 16.
14
John Leshy, The Making of the Arizona Constitution, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 68 (1988)
(further noting that the framers were especially concerned about corporate influence on
elections).
15
See Ariz. Const. art. VIII (allowing for liberal recall of public officials); Ariz. Const.
art. IV, § 1(3) (giving the People referendum power); Ariz. Const. art. IV, § 1(2) (giving the
people the power of initiative); Ariz. Const. art. IV, § 1(6) (protecting voter initiatives and
referenda from government veto, repeal, amendment, and diversion of funds); Ariz. Const.
art. IV, § 23 (forbidding “any person holding public office” from accepting a special pass or
privilege from a corporation); Ariz. Const. art. XXII, § 14 (“Any law which may be enacted
by the Legislature. . .may be enacted by the people under [an] Initiative.”). See also Leshy,
supra note 14, at 65–70.
16
Leshy, supra note 14, at 68–69.
17
Ariz. Const. art. XIV, § 18. Today, this provision is undoubtedly invalid given the
Supreme Court’s rulings in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
13
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campaign contributions . . . and expenditures . . . .”18
The Legislature, however, has woefully shirked this duty. Rather than
enacting laws requiring “publicity” of campaign contributions, the
Legislature has made Arizona “ground zero for dark money campaigns.”19
This Article argues that several of Arizona’s pro-dark-money statutes
violate Article 7, § 16 of the Arizona Constitution. More specifically, this
Article argues that A.R.S. § 16-901(43) and A.R.S. § 16-911(B) are
unconstitutional under the General Publicity Clause.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Campaign finance law is littered
with terms of art and unnecessary legal jargon—e.g., 501(c)(4)s, PACs,
super-PACs, etc. To make this Article as readable as possible, Part I
provides “definitions and explanations” of recurring legal terms. Part II
gives an overview of the history of Arizona campaign finance law. Part III
shows how several of Arizona’s campaign finance statutes violate the
Arizona Constitution. Part IV discusses potential justiciability concerns
that may arise when challenging these dark money statutes. And Part V
addresses likely counterarguments to this Article.
The political philosopher Ronald Dworkin once said, “Our politics are
a disgrace, and money is the root of the problem.”20 My hope is that this
Article will contribute, in some way, no matter how small, to reigning in
dark money in Arizona elections.
II. DEFINITIONS & EXPLANATIONS

Campaign finance law—especially as it relates to the tax code—is a
notoriously convoluted subject. For this reason, this section defines several
important terms used throughout this Article in (somewhat) easy-tounderstand language.
A. Political Action Committees (PACs)
A product of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, PACs are
political organizations that directly support a candidate or ballot measure.21
PACs are the primary financing mechanisms for the political activity of all
politicians.22 “They are the vehicles through which money is collected and

18

See Ariz. Const. art. VII, § 16.
Roberts, supra note 2.
20
RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY
351 (2000).
21
See Gregory J. Krieg, What is a Super PAC? A Short History, ABC NEWS, Aug. 9,
2012,
available
at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/super-pac-shorthistory/story?id=16960267.
22
See JAMES A. GARDNER & GUY-URIEL CHARLES, ELECTION LAW IN THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM 652 (2012).
19
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through which money is spent” in political campaigns.23
Under Arizona law, an entity must register as a PAC if (1) it is
organized for the primary purpose of influencing elections and (2) it
receives or spends over $1,000 in connection with any election during a
calendar year.24 A PAC is any group that spends an above-average amount
of money in election cycles. Prior to 2010, individuals were not allowed to
give more than $2,500 to PACs, and corporations and labor unions were
strictly forbidden from making donations.25 In 2010, however, Citizens
United and SpeechNow cleared the way for “independent-expenditureonly” groups, or super-PACs, to spend vast amounts of money in election
cycles.
B. Super-PACs & Mega-PACs
Super-PACs (or, in Arizona, mega-PACs) are political organizations
that do not make direct contributions to candidates or political parties, but
instead make independent expenditures in an effort to support or defeat a
candidate or ballot measure.26 These groups may raise unlimited sums of
money from corporations, unions, and wealthy individuals and may spend
unlimited sums of money to influence the outcomes of elections.27 They
may not, however, coordinate with a candidate for political office.28 SuperPACs are the product of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision
SpeechNow v. FEC,29 which relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Citizens United.30
In Arizona, super-PACs are called “megaPACs.”31 A PAC qualifies for mega-PAC status if it “receives at least ten
dollars in contributions from at least five hundred individuals” over a fouryear period.32
Mega-PACs can raise and spend unlimited money to influence
election outcomes.33 The downside to being labeled a mega-PAC,
however, is that, as opposed to traditional PACs, mega-PACs cannot

23

Id.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-905(B) (2016).
25
Krieg, supra note 21.
26
McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 193 n. 2 (2014).
27
Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1647 (2012).
28
See generally Richard Briffault, Coordination Reconsidered, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 88 (2013).
29
SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
30
See id. at 692–96.
31
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-908 (2016). Mega-PACs used to be called super-PACs. But
in 2016, SB 1516 changed the names without explanation. One reason may be because of
the negative connotation associated with the term “super-PAC.”
32
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-908(B) (2016).
33
Id.
24
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coordinate with candidates and cannot donate money directly to a
candidate’s campaign—all expenditures must be independent.34
This non-coordination requirement, however, is largely
unenforceable.35 The FEC does not have the time, resources, or inclination
to enforce this non-coordination requirement. For this reason, supposedly
independent super-PACs can be run by a candidate’s close associates,
friends, and former staff.36 For example, when Stephen Colbert ran for
“President of South Carolina,” his close friend Jon Stewart was in charge of
running his super-PAC, which was sarcastically—and appropriately—
renamed the “Definitely Not Coordinating with Stephen super PAC.”37
C. 501(c)(4) Organizations
A 501(c)(4) organization is a tax-exempt organization that is meant to
promote “social welfare.”38 These organizations can collect and spend
unlimited amounts of money on political campaigns, so long as the
organization’s primary purpose is not to influence the outcomes of
elections.39 They do not have to disclose their donors.40
There are certain organizations that are—at least in theory—so
intrinsically valuable that we as a society have decided to provide them
with certain tax breaks. Organizations that meet certain qualifications earn
“tax-exempt” status in the eyes of the almighty Internal Revenue Service
(IRS). Those qualifications, in large part, are laid out in 26 U.S.C. §
501(c).41 “Teachers’ retirement fund associations,” for example, are taxexempt under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(11).
In the campaign finance world, the most important 501(c)
organizations are those which receive tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(4).
Section 501(c)(4) tax-exempt status is reserved for non-profit “[c]ivic
34

Gardner & Charles, supra note 22, at 654.
See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, The Brave New World of Party Campaign Finance Law,
101 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 591 (2016) (noting that “campaign finance observers . . . widely
agree . . . that the legal definition of formal coordination is entirely opaque at the moment
and laughably easy to circumvent . . . .”).
36
See, e.g., Trevor Potter, Here’s What I Learned When I Helped Stephen Colbert Set
Up his Super PAC, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2015.
37
Neda Ulaby, Stephen Colbert Wants You To Know: That’s Definitely Not His
SuperPAC,
NPR,
(Jan.
20,
2015),
available
at
http://www.npr.org/sections/monkeysee/2012/01/20/145475089/stephen-colbert-wants-youto-know-thats-definitely-not-his-superpac.
38
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2016).
39
See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a).
40
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
22 (2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4221nc.pdf (last accessed Nov. 28,
2019).
41
Title 26 of the United States Code is dedicated to the “Internal Revenue Code.”
35
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leagues or organizations” that operate “exclusively for the promotion of
social welfare.”42 Some well-known 501(c)(4) organizations are the
National Rifle Association (NRA), Planned Parenthood, and the Sierra
Club. Spending by 501(c)(4) organizations has exploded in recent years.43
During the 2006 presidential election, for example, 501(c)(4) groups spent
approximately $5 million; and during the 2012 election, they spent
approximately $310 million.44
For the purposes of this Article, 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations
are important in at least two respects: (1) they may collect and spend
unlimited amounts of money on political campaigns, so long as influencing
elections is not the group’s “primary purpose”; and (2) they do not have to
disclose their donors’ identities.45 These organizations are the source of
“dark money” (defined below).
For example, one of the most notorious 501(c)(4) organizations is
Karl Rove’s Crossroads GPS.46 Since the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Citizens United, Crossroads GPS has raised more than $330 million from
unknown donors, and it has spent approximately $112 million for the
explicit purpose of influencing the outcomes of elections.47 Critics of
Rove’s Crossroads GPS correctly note that it is “anything but a ‘social
welfare’ organization; it is a political organization formed and operated to
influence federal elections.”48
Under federal law, a 501(c)(4) organization loses its tax-exempt status
if its “primary purpose” is to influence the outcomes of political elections.49
(As referenced above, it is no coincidence that Karl Rove raised $330
million but spent only $112 million—if the organization spent much more,
it could potentially lose its tax-exempt status.). This is very important for
the purposes of this Article, because, as of 2016, Arizona chose to exempt
501(c) organizations from the “primary purpose” requirement under state
law.50 Under Arizona law, so long as the organization “has tax exempt
42

26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2016).
Thomas B. Edsall, Dark Money in Politics, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2013.
44
Id.
45
Sean Sullivan, What is a 501(c)(4), Anyway?, WASH. POST, May 13, 2013.
46
Id.
47
Matea Gold, IRS Approves Tax-Exempt Status of Crossroads GPS After More than
Five Years, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2016.
48
Id.
49
See Trevor Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, The History of Undisclosed Spending in U.S.
Elections & How 2012 Became the “Dark Money” Election, 27 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 383, 419, 463 (2013) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976)). If an
organization’s “primary purpose” was to influence elections, it would be considered a
“political committee” and would be forced to disclose its donors. Id.
50
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-901(43) (2016) (“[A]n entity is not organized for the primary
purpose of influencing an election if . . . [t]he entity has tax exempt status under [§] 501(a)
43

LINDVALL (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

ENDING DARK MONEY IN ARIZONA

1/27/2020 12:01 PM

69

status under [§] 501(a) of the internal revenue code,” it is, by definition,
“not organized for the primary purpose of influencing . . . election[s].”51
This statute—A.R.S. § 16-901(43)—serves as a welcome mat for dark
money in Arizona. Now, so long as an organization remains in good
standing with the IRS, it can spend unlimited amounts of money to
influence Arizona elections and never have to report a single donor.52 Part
III of this Article explains why this law is unconstitutional.
D. Hard Money
Hard money is money donated directly to politicians. Hard money is
strictly regulated: donors must be disclosed; donations are capped; and
donations may not be accepted in exchange for an “official action.”53 Hard
money, in other words, is the money that goes directly into a candidate’s
political war chest.54 Hard money—at least when properly regulated—is
not a bad thing. For many, making a hard-money donation is the most
effective way to show their support for a candidate or to support a ballot
measure.
E. Soft Money
Soft money is money that is not given directly to a politician but is
still used to benefit their campaign. The money spent by independent
expenditure committees (super-PACs) and 501(c)(4) organizations is soft
money.55 This money does not go directly into the candidate’s campaign
coffers, but it still benefits the candidate. During campaign season, if one
sees an attack ad that ends with “this message was paid for by Americans
for Prosperity,” or something similar, that is a perfect example of soft
money. It is money spent by politically minded groups to influence the
outcome of an election but is not given directly to a candidate. SuperPACs and 501(c)(4) organizations, essentially, always spend “soft” money
on political campaigns.
of the internal revenue code.”).
51
Id.
52
As an aside, this law was passed strictly along partisan lines, with only Republicans
voting in favor of its passing. Republicans, in turn, gave the power to regulate these nonprofit political organizations back to the federal government—not only to the federal
government, but to the IRS: the organization that was recently entangled in a scandal for
directly targeting conservative 501(c) groups. Arizona Republicans, generally, have an
overwhelming distrust for the federal government. Yet Arizona Senate Republicans have
chosen to give the federal government ultimate oversight over the transparency of our
election process? Is this real life?
53
Dark Money Basics, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/darkmoney/basics (last visited July 3, 2017).
54
See id.
55
Id.
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F. Dark Money
Dark money is money that is spent on political campaigns from
undisclosed donors, usually through tax-exempt 501(c)(4) organizations.
Former Arizona House Majority Whip Chris Herstam called dark money
“the most corrupting influence [he’d] seen” in his thirty-three-year stint in
Arizona politics.56 Dark money works like this: a corporation, union, or
wealthy individual donates large sums of money to a 501(c)(4)
organization.57 That 501(c)(4) then donates that money to a superPAC.58 That super-PAC then spends that money to influence the outcome
of an upcoming election.59 And because 501(c)(4)s do not have to disclose
their donors, the public will never know where this money came
from.60 The super-PAC would have to report the contribution from the
501(c)(4), but not the contributions made to the 501(c)(4).61 Thus, dark
money is created.62
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ARIZONA’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS

The “Four Walls” of Arizona Campaign Finance Regulations
Fear of money’s corrupting influence is not a novel concept. As
Claudius said in Hamlet, “In the corrupted currents of this world,
[o]ffense’s gilded hand may shove by justice, [a]nd oft . . . [b]uys out the
law.”63 Similarly, in 1910, in his famous speech in Osawatomie, Kansas,
Teddy Roosevelt said:
There can be no effective control of corporations
while their political activity remains. To put an end to it
will be neither a short nor an easy task, but it can be
done . . . . Corporate expenditures for political purposes,
and especially such expenditures by public-service
corporations, have supplied one of the principal sources of
corruption in our political affairs.64
The term “dark money” may be new, but the governed always feared
it.
56

Lee et al., supra note 3, at 2.
David J. Cantelme, Arizona Campaign Finance Laws are Teetering, 51 AZ
ATTORNEY 36, 36 (2015); see also Dark Money Basics, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/dark-money/basics (last visited July 3, 2017).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
See, e.g., id.
63
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 3.
64
The full text of Roosevelt’s speech can be found at Eric Black, Teddy Roosevelt’s
Attack on Excessive Concentration of Wealth, MINN. POST, Dec. 7, 2011.
57
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As such, Arizona had a sturdy edifice of campaign finance regulations
prior to the Roberts Court’s dismantling of traditional campaign finance
law.65 The integrity of Arizona’s elections was protected by four statutory
walls: (1) registration requirements; (2) contribution limits; (3) strict
disclosure requirements; and (4) publicly funded resource-matching laws.66
The campaign registration laws required all candidates and
committees to register with Arizona’s Secretary of State. The State also
imposed relatively low contribution limits (which increased over time to
account for inflation). Non-candidate political committees—today, what
we would call PACs and super-PACs—were required to file disclosure
reports with the Secretary of State, listing their donors, the donors’
contributions, and how that money was spent influencing the election(s).
Further, Arizona’s fund-matching provisions publicly financed certain
eligible candidates to ensure that elections were financially competitive.
Several of these walls, however, have been demolished; and those that
remain rest on a shaky foundation.
A. Political Spending & Citizens United
The first of these walls to crumble was Arizona’s campaigncontribution limits. In 2009, one year before Citizens United, Arizona law
forbade super-PACs from donating more than $1,664 to a legislative
campaign, and individual contributions were capped at $410 per
candidate.67 Then came Citizens United.68 There, the Supreme Court,
unprompted, held that the First Amendment prohibits the government from
setting caps on independent expenditures.69 “[I]ndependent expenditures,”
the Court held, “do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of
corruption.”70 Because candidates are not allowed to coordinate with
independent expenditure committees, Justice Kennedy argued, that negates
the possibility that independent expenditures will result in the sort of quid
pro quo corruption the government can legitimately prohibit.71 With that,
corporations, unions, and wealthy individuals were free to spend unlimited
65

See Cantelme, supra note 57, at 36.
Id. at 36.
67
2009–2010 Contribution Limits, ARIZ. SECRETARY OF STATE (Aug. 14, 2009),
http://apps.azsos.gov/election/2010/Info/Campaign_Contribution_Limits_2010.htm.
68
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
69
Id. at 357–61.
70
Id. at 357. This holding is one of the most criticized in the history of the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., id. at 393–480 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Michael S. Kang, The End of
Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1 (2012); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and
the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Conservatives Embrace Judicial Activism in Campaign Finance Ruling, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
22, 2010.
71
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357–61.
66

LINDVALL (DO NOT DELETE)

72

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

1/27/2020 12:01 PM

[Vol. 44:1

amounts of money to influence the outcomes of elections.72
B. Fund-Matching & Bennett
The second of these walls to fall was Arizona’s fund-matching
program. Arizona, like most states, discovered that contribution limits,
standing alone, are not enough to quell political corruption. Five years
after the enactment of these limits, Arizona suffered “the worst public
corruption scandal in its history.”73 In that scandal, known as “AZ Scam,”
nearly 10% of Arizona’s legislators were caught accepting campaign
contributions or bribes in exchange for supporting legislation.74 Following
that incident, Arizona voters decided that further reform was necessary.
Accordingly, in 1998, Arizonans, through initiative, passed the
Citizens Clean Elections Act.75 That Act, in part, allowed certain eligible
candidates running for political office to receive “equalizing” funds from
the State Treasury.76 In many instances, the Act required the State to
equalize the candidates’ campaign war chests (for example, if privatelyfunded “Candidate A” raised $1 million and super-PACs ran $500,000
worth of ads supporting him, the State would give publicly-funded
“Candidate B” $1.5 million to level the playing field).77
In 2011, however, in Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett, the U.S.
Supreme Court gutted Arizona’s fund-matching program. “Laws like
Arizona’s matching funds provision that inhibit robust and wide-open
political debate without sufficient justification cannot stand,” the Court
held.78 Because spending and raising money could cause a privatelyfinanced candidate’s opponent to receive additional state money, the law
forced these privately-financed candidates to “shoulder a special and
potentially significant burden when choosing [whether] to exercise
[their] First Amendment right to spend funds on behalf of [their]
candidacy.”79 And with that, the primary provision of the Citizens Clean
Elections Act was declared unconstitutional, and Arizona’s second wall of
72
In 2016, for example, George Soros alone spent over $2 million in a successful effort
to dethrone Maricopa County Sherriff Joe Arpaio. Scott Bland, Soros Spends $2 Million to
Defeat Arpaio, POLITICO, Nov. 4, 2016.
73
Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 761
(2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
74
Id.
75
Id. at 728.
76
Id. at 729 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 16-952(A), (B), and (C)(4)–(5), which
provided for the “[e]qual funding of candidates”).
77
See id. at 729–32.
78
Id. at 755. It is wholly unclear how making elections more competitive “inhibit[s]
robust and wide-open political debate,” and it blinks reality to baldly assert that Arizona
lacked a “sufficient justification” for its fund-matching provisions.
79
Id. at 737 (internal quotes omitted).
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protection fell.
C. Disclosure Requirements & SB 1516
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the government has a
compelling interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption in our democratic processes.80 As such, the states can—and
should—require the disclosure of political donors. Even the Citizens
United Court noted that “disclosure . . . can provide shareholders and
citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected
officials accountable for their positions and supporters.”81
Prior to 2016, Arizona’s disclosure laws were not perfect, but they
were at least reasonably tailored to ensure the public knew who financed
Arizona’s political campaigns.82 In 2016, Governor Ducey signed Senate
Bill 151683 into law. If allowed to stand, SB 1516 could effectively tear
down a third campaign finance wall: the disclosure requirement. In short,
SB 1516—which is currently codified in Title 16 of the Arizona Revised
Statutes—is one of the most pro-dark-money statutes imaginable.84
SB 1516 overhauled Arizona’s campaign finance law in three ways.
First, it changed the definition of “contribution” to exclude things such as
travel expenses,85 the use of real or personal property,86 or the payment of
legal expenses.87 Thus, under a plain reading of this statute, a corporation
could fly a politician to the CEO’s house on a private jet, wine and dine
him, and send him back with the knowledge that the corporation plans to
make a hefty donation to a politically-minded 501(c)(4) that supports
him—and none of this would have to be disclosed.88
Second, it raised the standard for proving coordination between

80

See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 369 (2010); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S.
724, 741 (2008); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67, 72 (1976).
81
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370.
82
Cf. Cantelme, supra note 57, at 36–37.
83
2016 Ariz. ALS 79, 2016 Ariz. Sess. Laws 79, 2016 Ariz. Ch. 79, 2016 Ariz. SB
1516.
The
text
of
SB
1516
can
be
found
at
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/52leg/2r/bills/sb1516s.pdf.
84
See, e.g., Ann M. Ravel, States Can Bring Political ‘Dark Money’ Into the Light,
L.A. TIMES, July 20, 2016 (noting that Arizona’s dark money problem is “particularly
egregious” and that SB 1516 shows “Arizona doesn’t recognize how [the rise in dark
money] is undermining its elections”); Laurie Roberts, Roll Call: Who Supported Expanding
Dark Money in Arizona, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 18, 2016; Mary Jo Pitzl, Arizona ‘Dark
Money’ Bill on its Way to Gov. Doug Ducey, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, March 29, 2016.
85
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-911(B)(1)(a) (2016).
86
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-911(B)(1)(b) (2016).
87
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-911(B)(6)(c) (2016).
88
Cf. Pitzl, supra note 84.
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politicians and independent expenditure committees.89 Prior to SB 1516,
prosecuting agencies needed only “reasonable cause” of wrongdoing to
charge a politician for coordinating with an independent expenditure
committee.90 SB 1516, added an “intent” element to this burden of proof.91
This makes proving—and stopping—unlawful coordination much more
difficult.
Finally, it removed the “primary purpose” requirement for 501(c)(4)
organizations. The federal government only determines whether a nonprofit organization gets “tax-exempt” status under the Internal Revenue
Code; it is not a political regulatory agency.92 The IRS is concerned only
with collecting taxes, not policing organizations’ political activities.93 The
states, accordingly, are primarily in charge of regulating these
organizations through their police powers.94
SB 1516, however, gave much of this regulatory power back to the
IRS. Now, under Arizona law, a 501(c)(4), by definition, is not organized
for the primary purpose of influencing an election if it remains in good
standing with the IRS.95 In other words, Arizona is asking the IRS to act as
the overseer of its dark money groups. The IRS, however, is not capable of
such a regulatory task,96 nor does it have the inclination to do so given its
recent regulatory scandals.97 In 2013, the IRS was wrapped in scandal for
its treatment of conservative “Tea Party” organizations.98 As a result, the
IRS has largely stepped aside as a political regulator—and has made this
fact publicly known.99
What this statute means in practice is that it is open season for dark
money groups in Arizona. In an op-ed for the Los Angeles Times, former
FEC Commissioner Ann Ravel chastised Arizona for failing to see the
extent to which dark money is undermining the integrity of its electoral

89

Id.
Id.
91
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-922(B)(2)(b).
92
Linda Sugin, Nonprofit Oversight Under Siege: Politics, Disclosure, and State Law
Solutions for 501(c)(4) Organizations, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 895, 896–97 (2016).
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-901(42).
96
Sugin, supra note 92, at 897 (noting that the IRS is a revenue-collector, not a
political regulator).
97
See generally Evelyn Brody & Marcus Owens, Exile to Main Street: The IRS’s
Diminished Role in Overseeing Tax-Exempt Organizations, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 859
(2016).
98
Id.
99
See Eric Lichtblau, I.R.S. Expected to Stand Aside as Nonprofits Increase Role in
2016 Race, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2015.
90
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process.100 Ravel cited SB 1516 as evidence that the Arizona Legislature
either does not know or does not care about the corrupting effect of dark
money.101
Being from California, Ravel had good standing to level these
accusations, because in 2014, Arizona prompted California to adopt the
most expansive political disclosure requirements in the country, designed
to shed light on politically-minded 501(c)(4) organizations.102 These
statutes were prompted by the overreach of Arizona dark money groups
into California politics.103 In 2013, two Arizona 501(c)(4) organizations—
Americans for Responsible Leadership and the Center to Protect Patient
Rights—contributed $11 million to a California-based PAC to support a
ballot measure that would curb unions’ political fundraising capabilities.104
Thanks to this funding, that initiative passed. Because the money was
filtered through a 501(c)(4), Californians remained unaware of the
revenue’s source.
In response to this out-of-state meddling, California passed SB 27,
requiring “multipurpose organizations”—such as 501(c)(4)s—to disclose
the identity of their donors in mandatory state filings.105 The Bill’s sponsor
stated that its purpose was to prohibit “[the] laundering [of] campaign cash
through nonprofits to hide one’s true identity.”106 Arizona’s dark money
problem is so bad that its spillover is causing neighboring states to pass
laws to protect the integrity of their political processes.107 The Arizona
100

Ravel, supra note 84.
Id.
102
See Cal. Gov. Code § 84222; Sugin, supra note 92, at 904.
103
Patrick Ford, Chapter 16: Combating Dark Money in California Politics,
46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 335, 339–40 (2014).
104
Sugin, supra note 92, at 904, n.61. The Center to Protect Patient Rights is a
501(c)(4) organization funded by the infamous Koch brothers. DAVID R. BERMAN, DARK
MONEY IN ARIZONA: THE RIGHT TO KNOW, FREE SPEECH AND PLAYING WHACK-A-MOLE 4
(2014) (published by Arizona State University’s Morrison Institute for Public Policy),
available
at
https://morrisoninstitute.asu.edu/sites/default/files/content/products/DarkMoney.pdf.
105
S.B. 27, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014). More importantly, the law “attempts to
follow the daisy chain of contributions from one exempt organization to another,” requiring
disclosure by each organization in the chain. Sugin, supra note 92, at 905. S.B. 27 is now
codified, in part, in Cal. Gov. Code § 84222.
106
Brian Joseph, O.C. Senator Introduces Bill to Illuminate “Dark Money”, ORANGE
COUNTY REG. (Dec. 4, 2012). The Bill’s sponsor was Sen. Lou Correa. The California
Political Practices Commission also commented that this Bill’s “disclosure of donors
provides voters with vital information on who is funding campaigns [and] increases
transparency to deter actual or perceived corruption. . .” Cal. Fair Political Practices
Comm’n, Multipurpose Organizations Reporting Political Spending 1 (2014), available at
http://www.fppc.ca.gov/content/dam/fppc/NSDocuments/TAD/Campaign%20Documents/Multipurpose%20Organizations.pdf.
107
See generally Sugin, supra note 92, at 904–07; Ford, supra note 103, at 339–54.
101
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Legislature, however, has remained recalcitrant, despite its constitutional
obligation to act.
IV. A.R.S. § 16-901(43) AND A.R.S. § 16-911(B) VIOLATE ARTICLE 7, § 16
OF THE ARIZONA CONSTITUTION
The Arizona Legislature has not only shirked its duty to provide for a
“general publicity” of campaign expenditures and contributions, it has
passed legislation that further obscures and conceals the source of
campaign funding. A.R.S. § 16-901(43) emboldens and deregulates
501(c)(4) organizations, thereby setting the stage for a surge in dark
money. A.R.S. § 16-911(B) sets forth an extremely narrow definition of
what amounts to a political “contribution,” thereby allowing bribe-like
activity to go undisclosed. These two provisions are directly contradict the
General Publicity Clause.
A. The Text of the Unconstitutional Statutes
1. A.R.S. § 16-901(43)
A.R.S. § 16-901(43) provides the definition of an organization’s
“primary purpose.” (Remember, an organization’s primary purpose
determines whether that organization receives tax-exempt status in the eyes
of the IRS. More specifically, a 501(c)(4) organization loses its tax-exempt
status if its primary purpose is to influence election outcomes.) Section 16901(43) provides: “[A]n entity is not organized for the primary purpose of
influencing an election if . . . [t]he entity has tax exempt status under [§]
501(a) of the internal revenue code.”108 In other words, all 501(c)(4)
organizations, by definition, are not organized for the primary purpose of
influencing elections. This means that 501(c)(4) organizations—like Karl
Rove’s Crossroads GPS, the NRA, and Planned Parenthood—can spend
unlimited amounts of money on Arizona campaigns as long as the IRS does
not say otherwise. Further, as the Arizona Legislature knew when they
passed this law, the IRS has largely abdicated its enforcement
responsibilities.109
2. A.R.S. § 16-911(B)
Under Arizona law, politicians must disclose any “contributions” they
receive. A.R.S. § 16-911(B), however, changed the definition of what
qualifies as a “contribution.” Section 16-911(B) provides, in part: “The
following are not contributions: (1) The value of an individual’s volunteer

108
109

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-901(43)(a) (2016).
Potter & Morgan, supra note 49, at 466–67; Lichtblau, supra note 99.
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services . . . including . . . : (a) travel expenses; (b) use of real or personal
property; (c) cost of invitations, food or beverages; . . . .”110
Under a plain reading of this statute, a corporation could fly a
politician to a private fundraiser (“travel expenses”) on a private jet (the
“use of personal property”), wine and dine him (the “cost of . . . food [and]
beverages”), and inform him that the corporation intends to make a sizeable
donation to a supportive 501(c)(4) organization, yet none of this would
ever have to be reported because the corporation did not “contribute” to
him. Something is wrong with this picture.
Contrast this with the federal government’s definition, which defines a
“contribution” as any “gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of
money or anything of value made . . . for the purpose of influencing any
election for Federal office.”111
B. Interpreting Article 7, § 16
The courts have never had an opportunity to interpret Article 7, §
16.112 The section’s meaning, therefore, is not precisely known. Judges,
however, have a set of legal tools they can employ to determine what is
required by a constitutional provision. Specifically, when determining the
proper meaning of a constitutional provision, judges should look to the
provision’s (i) text, (ii) history, and (iii) purpose, along with (iv) the
potential consequences of a particular interpretation.113 Each of these
considerations will be discussed in turn.
1. The text of Article 7, § 16
Article 7, § 16 reads as follows:
The legislature, at its first session, shall enact a law providing for a
general publicity, before and after election, of all campaign contributions
to, and expenditures of campaign committees and candidates for public
office.114
Most of this provision’s requirements can be gathered from its text: it
requires the Legislature to “enact a law” that provides for “a general
110

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-911(B) (2016).
2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
112
JOHN D. LESHY, THE ARIZONA STATE CONSTITUTION 244 (2d ed. 2013).
113
Hayes v. Continental Ins. Co., 872 P.2d 668, 672 (Ariz. 1994) (noting that the courts
will use a provision’s “context; its language, subject matter, and historical background; its
effects and consequences; and its spirit and purpose” when interpreting ambiguous
language); Wyatt v. Wehmueller, 806 P.2d 870, 873 (Ariz. 1991) (same); State v. Korzep,
799 P.2d 831, 834 (Ariz. 1990) (same); see also STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR
DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 74 (2010) (arguing that a judge’s interpretational tools
are text, history, tradition, precedent, purpose, and consequences).
114
Ariz. Const. art. VII, § 16.
111
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publicity” of “campaign contributions. . .and expenditures.” Campaign
“contributions” and “expenditures” are quite well-defined.115 Contributions
are money donations made directly to a political campaign, and
expenditures refer to the campaign’s spending of money to win the
election. Ambiguity arises, however, when determining what is meant by
the “general publicity” requirement. To determine what is meant by “a
general publicity,” we must look to the provision’s history and purpose.
2. The history of the General Publicity Clause
The General Publicity Clause was ratified as an original part of the
Arizona Constitution in 1912.
Throughout the century preceding
ratification, the costs of elections had risen dramatically mirroring the rise
of corporations in American economic life.116 Further, in many states,
politicians and corporate executives had an unsettling symbiotic
relationship. Several years before Arizona was admitted to the Union,
Senator Boies Penrose, a prominent Republican from Pennsylvania, said of
the corporation/politician relationship:
I believe in the division of labor: You send us to
Congress; we pass laws under which you make money . . .
and out of your profits, you further contribute to our
campaign funds to send us back again to pass more laws to
enable you to make more money.117
The framers of the Arizona Constitution were keenly aware of corrupt
behavior like Penrose’s when they authored the General Publicity Clause—
indeed, all of Article 7.118
Just five years before Arizona became a state, Congress passed the
Tillman Act, which prohibited “any corporation” from “mak[ing] a money
contribution in . . . any election to any political office . . . .”119 Two years
before Arizona was admitted to statehood, Congress passed the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which required candidates for Congress to
disclose the names of their contributors and amounts of expenditures before
and after their elections.120
115
See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12–36 (1976) (defining and
distinguishing “contributions” and “expenditures” for First Amendment purposes).
116
Gardner & Charles, supra note 22, at 638.
117
Id.
118
See Leshy, supra note 14, at 68 (noting that the framers were particularly worried
about corporations’ corrupting influences in elections). See also Ariz. Const. art. XIV, § 18
(forbidding corporations from contributing to political campaigns); Ariz. Const. art. IV, §
19(13) (forbidding politicians from accepting any special pass or privilege from a
corporation).
119
Gardner & Charles, supra note 22, at 638–39.
120
Id. at 639.
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Shortly after Arizona was admitted to statehood, Senator Joe Robison
made the following statement on the Senate floor:
We all know . . . that one of the great political evils of
the time is the apparent hold on political parties [that]
business interests and certain organizations . . . obtain by
reason of liberal campaign contributions. Many believe
that when an individual or association of individuals makes
large contributions for the purpose of aiding candidates of
political parties in winning the elections, they expect, and
sometimes demand, and occasionally, at least, receive,
consideration
by
the
beneficiaries
of
their
contributions . . . .121
Put simply, the framers drafted the Arizona Constitution during a
revolutionary period in the history of campaign finance reform; and the
language of Article 7 reflects that.
3. The Purpose of the General Publicity Clause
Article 7, § 16 is meant to create “a general publicity” of campaign
contributions and expenditures. But what was this provision meant to
accomplish? John Leshy—who is arguably the leading authority on the
Arizona Constitution—has noted that Article 7 is generally meant to
“ensure that the citizen’s right to cast his vote [is] meaningful and that
elections [are] pure.”122 When read in light of the other provisions of
Article 7, it is apparent that the General Publicity Clause is meant to serve
as a mechanism for keeping the voting public informed as to who is
financing Arizona’s political campaigns.
The framers of the Arizona Constitution were particularly fearful of
corporations influencing Arizona elections.123 Arizona has a distinct fourth
branch of government—the Corporation Commission—whose primary
purpose is to regulate and monitor corporate activity.124 The crux of Article
7 is to limit corporate influence of Arizona elections, and the only fair
reading of the General Publicity Clause is the one that concludes that the
framers wanted to make Arizona elections as transparent as possible.

121
United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers Of
America, 352 U.S. 567, 576 (1957) (citing 65 Cong. Rec. 9507–08).
122
Leshy, supra note 14, at 68.
123
Id. (noting that the framers were particularly worried about corporations’ corrupting
influences in elections). See also Ariz. Const. art. XIV, § 18 (forbidding corporations from
contributing to political campaigns); Ariz. Const. art. IV, § 19(13) (forbidding politicians
from accepting any special pass or privilege from a corporation).
124
See generally Ariz. Const. art. XV (entitled “The Corporation Commission”).
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4. The Consequences of Leaving the Contested Statutes in Place
Continuing to allow dark money to flood Arizona elections could
further erode the public’s trust in government. In a democracy where
representatives were beholden to their constituents, voting for SB 1516
would have been political suicide. In Arizona, however, where dark money
reigns, voting for this Bill was politically prudent—it further allowed
anonymous donors to funnel millions of dollars into politicians’ campaign
coffers.
Polling data shows that the vast majority of Arizonans opposed SB
1516 and other similar bills. In March 2016, several months before SB
1516 was signed into law, ProgressNow Arizona conducted a survey to
gauge public opinion on SB 1516 and similar bills being considered in the
State House of Representatives. That survey found that just 17% of
Arizona voters supported SB 1516 after hearing the arguments against it,
and 81% of voters said they would be less likely to vote for a candidate
who supported the Bill.125 In a New York Times poll, over 80% of those
interviewed believed money played too large a roll in state and federal
elections, and 67% said that wealthy Americans have a disproportionate
chance of influencing elected representatives.126 That poll further noted
that 75% of self-identified Republicans supported stronger disclosure
laws.127 Yet in both Arizona and Washington, D.C., “Republican leaders in
[the Legislature] have blocked legislation to require more disclosure by
political nonprofit groups, which do not reveal the names of their
donors.”128
Dark money and its corrupting influence are clearly problems in
desperate need of correction. Because the political branches are illsuited—perhaps incapable—of solving this problem, the courts have a duty
to act. These laws must be struck down as unconstitutional to protect the
integrity and transparency of Arizona’s democratic processes.

125
PUBLIC POLICY POLLING, ARIZONA SURVEY RESULTS 1 (2016), available
at http://progressnowarizona.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/NewPoll_Dark-MoneyCitizen-Referendum-and-Redistricting.pdf.
126
See Nicolas Confessore & Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Shows Americans Favor an
Overhaul of Campaign Financing, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2015.
127
Id.
128
Id.; Roberts, supra note 84 (noting that SB 1516 was passed on strictly partisan lines,
with only Republicans voting for its passage).
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V. JUSTICIABILITY CONCERNS
A. Standing
If these laws were challenged in a federal court, there is a low chance
the court would grant the plaintiff(s) standing. That is because the federal
courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s standing doctrine, which restricts
the federal courts only to plaintiffs who have suffered a “distinct and
palpable injury”129 that is not too “general”130 in nature.
For example, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court held that
environmental protection groups do not have standing to challenge
environmental policies unless its members have suffered a “concrete and
particularized” injury.131 This requires the plaintiff to have more than a
“general interest” in the outcome of the suit, and that she make more than a
generalized grievance about the government.132 Similarly, in Los Angeles
v. Lyons, the Court held that the victim of a police chokehold did not have
standing to challenge the police department’s “chokehold policy” because
there was no evidence that there was a “real and immediate threat of future
injury [to] the [victim].”133
For many, achieving Article III standing is an insurmountable task.134
The Arizona courts, however, are not bound by the strictures of Article
III.135 Rather, as the Arizona Supreme Court has noted, Arizona’s
justiciability doctrine “is a prudential consideration rather than a
jurisdictional one.”136 For this reason, the Arizona courts waived the
traditional standing requirements when a case (1) presents an “issue[] of
great public importance” and (2) the parties to that case are “true
adversaries.”137 Both of these two prongs will be discussed in turn.

129

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978).
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1992).
131
Id. at 560.
132
Id. at 573–76.
133
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.8 (1983).
134
See id. at 113–137 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.
Ct. 1543 (2016); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013); Gene Nichol, Jr.,
Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985).
135
Dobson v. State, 309 P.3d 1289, 1292 (Ariz. 2013) (recognizing that the Arizona
courts are not bound by the “case or controversy” requirement of Art. III, § 2 of the U.S.
Constitution). Compare Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (prohibiting
taxpayer standing), with Ethington v. Wright, 189 P.2d 209 (Ariz. 1948) (allowing taxpayer
standing in Arizona when the taxpayer asserts a sufficiently important interest related to the
expenditure of her tax dollars).
136
Biggs v. Cooper, 341 P.3d 457, 460 (Ariz. 2014).
137
Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d 1013, 1019 (Ariz. 1998).
130
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1. Issues of “Great Public Importance”
Arizona’s prudential standing requirements are in place, in part, to
lighten the courts’ caseload. These requirements, however, are not
inexorable commandments that prevent judges from hearing truly
important cases. In Rios v. Symington, for example, the court disregarded
“potential standing issues” because the dispute involved issues central to
the healthy functioning of Arizona’s state government.138 In Rios, the
President of the State Senate challenged the constitutionality of the
Governor’s use of a line item veto.139 Typically, members of the
Legislature do not have standing if they allege only an “institutional
injury.”140 However, because Rios involved “a dispute at the highest levels
of [Arizona’s] state government,” the court ignored traditional standing
requirements.141
Similarly, in Goodyear Farms v. Avondale, the court heard a case
challenging the constitutionality of municipal annexation ordinances
without addressing whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue.142 Because
the action raised issues of great public importance that were likely to recur,
addressing standing was not necessary.143
The constitutionality of state campaign finance laws is surely an issue
of great public importance worthy of receiving relaxed justiciability
standards. Rios and Goodyear illustrate that constitutional challenges are
likely to be treated as “more important” for justiciability purposes. Further,
issues that touch upon the proper functioning of our state government are
treated with special deference under Arizona standing doctrine.144 A
constitutional challenge to Arizona’s dark money statutes would satisfy
both of these factors and should therefore be thought of as an “issue of
great public importance” for justiciability purposes.

138

See Rios v. Symington, 833 P.2d 20, 22 n.2 (Ariz. 1992).
Id.
140
See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821, 830 (1997) (dismissing several Senators’
challenge to President Clinton’s line item vetoes because members of the Legislature do not
have standing to challenge an “institutional injury”); Bennett v. Napolitano, 81 P.3d 311,
317–18 (Ariz. 2003) (same).
141
Rios, 833 P.2d at 22.
142
Goodyear Farms v. City of Avondale, 714 P.2d 386 (Ariz. 1986).
143
Id. at 387 n.1.
144
See Biggs v. Cooper, 341 P.3d 457 (Ariz. 2014); Forty-Seventh Legislature v.
Napolitano, 143 P.3d 1023 (Ariz. 2006); Rios, 833 P.2d at 22.
139

LINDVALL (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

ENDING DARK MONEY IN ARIZONA

1/27/2020 12:01 PM

83

2. Parties That Are “True Adversaries”
In addition to reducing caseload, Arizona’s prudential standing
requirements seek to “sharpen the legal issues” by only allowing cases
between “true adversaries.”145 By requiring the parties to be truly
adversarial, the courts increase the likelihood that the issues will be fully
briefed and zealously argued because the parties will have a stake in the
outcome of the litigation.146
For this reason, the courts typically do not allow plaintiffs to make
“generalized grievances”—i.e., claims that do not affect the plaintiff
personally, but that are made on behalf of society generally.147 In many
instances, however, the party who was “injured” may have fewer resources
or poorer arguments than other potential plaintiffs.148 Accordingly, to
ensure the sharpest possible issues, the Arizona courts have allowed
plaintiffs to air generalized grievances if (1) the plaintiff has “a legitimate
interest” in the controversy and (2) “judicial economy and administration
would be promoted” by allowing the case to proceed.149
The proliferation of dark money does not “injure” any one person—
just as a Governor accepting a bribe would not injure any one person.
Corruption affects the political system, and it would behoove the Arizona
courts to put a stop to it, even if it means relaxing their justiciability
requirements. If the plaintiff has a “legitimate interest” in the healthy
functioning of Arizona’s campaign finance system, the courts should grant
that party standing to sue.
B. The Political Question Doctrine
As a matter of prudence, the Arizona courts have refused to decide
cases that amount to a “nonjusticiable political question.”150 Many cases
involve issues that touch on hot-button political topics—but that does not
145

Bennett v. Brownlow, 119 P.3d 460, 463 (Ariz. 2005); Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d 1013,
1019 (Ariz. 1998).
146
See Strawberry Water Co. v. Paulsen, 207 P.3d 654, 659 (Ariz. 2008).
147
See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Ariz. Ass’n of Providers for
Persons with Disabilities v. State, 219 P.3d 216, 223 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009); Home Builders
Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. Kard, 199 P.3d 629, 632–33 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
148
For example, if the issue to be litigated concerned the government’s environmental
regulations, the Sierra Club would be a great litigant to have on one side of the issue. But
the Sierra Club is seldom “injured” by the government’s environmental policies, and
therefore often lacks standing to sue. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 272 (1972).
149
Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n v. Episcopal Community Servs., 712 P.2d 914,
919 (Ariz. 1985). This two-part test is just a fancy way of saying the Arizona courts will
ignore the standing requirements if the issue is important enough and there are two good
lawyers on each side.
150
See, e.g., Kromko v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 165 P.3d 168, 170–71 (Ariz. 2007);
Fogliano v. Brain, 270 P.3d 839, 846–47 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).
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necessarily mean the cases involve a “political question.” A nonjusticiable
political question arises when either (1) there is a “textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment” of the issue to a coordinate branch of
government, or (2) there is “a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards” for resolving the issue.151
For example, Article 11, § 6 of the Arizona Constitution requires the
Arizona State Legislature to make university tuition “as nearly free as
possible.”152 However, in Kromko v. Arizona Board of Regents, the
Arizona Supreme Court held that interpreting this language would amount
to a nonjusticiable political question.153 Because the duty to make tuition as
free as possible was constitutionally committed to the Legislature and there
was no manageable way to determine whether the tuition was “as free” as it
could be, the Arizona Supreme Court refused to decide the case.154
In contrast, the court held in Roosevelt v. Bishop that the courts could
determine whether the state’s school districts were sufficiently “general and
uniform,” as required by Article 11, § 1 of the Arizona Constitution.155
Determining whether school districts received roughly equal funding was a
“judicially manageable” question—the court could simply compare and
contrast the funding received by each school district.156
Similarly, determining whether the Arizona Legislature has “enact[ed]
a law providing for a general publicity . . . of all campaign
contributions. . .and expenditures” is not a political question.157 The
Arizona Constitution expressly directs the Legislature to enact a variety of
laws. Article 10, § 10 requires the Legislature to provide laws for the sale
of state lands.158 Article 18, § 1 requires the Legislature to enact laws
instituting an eight-hour workday for public employees.159 Article 11
151
Kromko, 165 P.3d at 170 (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228
(1993)).
152
Ariz. Const. art XI, § 6.
153
Kromko, 165 P.3d at 173.
154
Id.
155
Roosevelt Elementary School District No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994).
156
Kromko, 165 P.3d at 173 (noting that there were “judicially discoverable and
manageable standards” for resolving the issue in Roosevelt).
157
Cf. Harlan Grant Cohen, A Politics-Reinforcing Political Question Doctrine, 49
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 5 (2017) (arguing that the political question doctrine should be applied in a
way that “preserve[s] space for substantive policy debates” without “shielding the
government from proper scrutiny”).
158
Ariz. Const. art. X, § 10 (“The legislature shall provide by proper laws for the sale of
all state lands or the lease of such lands, and shall further provide . . . laws for the protection
of the . . . residents and lessees of said lands . . . .”).
159
Id. at art. XVIII, § 1 (“Eight hours and no more, shall constitute a lawful day’s work
in all employment by, or on behalf of, the state or any political subdivision of the State. The
legislature shall enact such laws as may be necessary to put this provision into effect, and
shall prescribe proper penalties for any violations of said laws.”).
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requires the Legislature to enact laws that adequately fund the publicschool system.160
These provisions are surely enforceable.161 In fact, under Article
2, § 32, they are “mandatory.”162 For example, if the Legislature refused to
enact a law instituting an eight-hour workday (as required by Article
18, § 1), but instead passed a law requiring all public employees to work
fifteen-hour days, the people would expect—perhaps demand—the courts
to strike down this law. Similarly, if the Legislature refused to enact a law
requiring public disclosure of campaign contributions (as required by
Article 7, § 16), but instead passed laws that allowed millions of
undisclosed dollars to flood our political elections, no one would doubt the
courts’ authority to remedy this problem.
The Arizona courts, moreover, not only have the authority to strike
down these corrupt campaign finance laws, they have a duty to do so.163 In
Roosevelt, for example, the Arizona Supreme Court required the
Legislature to “enact appropriate laws to finance education in the public
schools” and tasked the Superior Court with “determin[ing] whether . . .
[appropriate] legislative action ha[d] been taken.”164
Concededly,
Roosevelt put the courts in a precarious position—if the Legislature ignored
the court order, there would be no practical way to enforce it.165 However,
given the importance of public education and the constitutional
160

Id. at art. XI, § 1 (“The legislature shall enact such laws as shall provide for the
establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public school system . . . .”); id. at
art. XI, § 9 (“[T]he legislature shall enact such laws as will provide for increasing the county
fund sufficiently to maintain all the public schools of the county for a minimum term of six
months in every school year . . . .”); id. at art. XI, § 10 (“[T]he legislature shall make such
appropriations, to be met by taxation, as shall insure the proper maintenance of all state
educational institutions, and shall make such special appropriations as shall provide for their
development and improvement . . . .”).
161
In fact, the Arizona courts have consistently and explicitly required the Legislature to
enact laws that better provide for Arizona’s public school system pursuant to Article 11.
See Hull v. Albrecht, 960 P.2d 634 (Ariz. 1998); Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v.
Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994).
162
Ariz. Const. art. II, § 32 (“The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory, unless
by express words they are declared to be otherwise.”).
163
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 663 (1961) (“It is the duty of the courts to be watchful
of constitutional rights and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.”) (citing Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)); Rural/Metro Corp. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 629
P.2d 86, 89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (“It is the duty of the courts, not the legislature, to
interpret and construe ambiguous constitutional provisions.”), rev’d on other grounds, 629
P.2d 83 (Ariz. 1981). See also Roosevelt, 877 P.2d at 815 (striking down Arizona’s
statutory financing scheme for public education because “the laws chosen by the legislature
to implement its constitutional obligation” were insufficient).
164
Roosevelt, 877 P.2d at 816.
165
Perhaps the Executive branch could have enforced the order by force. But what
would that look like: the state police ordering legislators to pass appropriate school-funding
bills?
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implications of the issue, the Roosevelt Court had no choice but to enter the
fray. The same is true of these campaign finance statutes. If the
Legislature continues to shirk its duty to make Arizona elections
transparent, public confidence in our state democracy will gradually
eroded, and our governing bodies would cease to have proper legitimacy.
As Roosevelt illustrates, the courts will direct the Legislature to fulfill
its constitutional obligations if the case is sufficiently important and
judicially manageable.166 Like the plaintiffs in Roosevelt, a plaintiff
challenging the Legislature’s failure to “enact a law providing for a general
publicity . . . of . . . campaign contributions” is merely asking the State to
“enact laws necessary to establish and maintain a system that will
transform that right from dry words on paper to a reality, bringing to
fruition the progressive views of those who founded this state.”167
C. Conclusion to Part IV
The courts usually do not allow plaintiffs to air “generalized
grievances.” However, they will hear certain generalized cases when the
issues are sufficiently important, and the parties are truly adversarial. The
constitutionality of Arizona campaign finance laws is an issue of great
public importance. Therefore, if there are two adversarial parties willing to
fully brief the issues, the Arizona courts should grant the plaintiffs
standing.
Additionally, interpreting the General Publicity Clause would not
amount to a nonjusticiable political question. As Roosevelt illustrates, the
courts will not allow the Legislature to completely shirk its constitutional
obligations. If the Legislature passes laws that “create substantial
disparities among [the public] schools,” the courts will strike those laws
down under Article 11, § 1.168 Similarly, when the Legislature passes laws
that allow millions of dollars in dark money to flood our state elections, the
courts should not hesitate to strike down these laws under Article 7, § 16.169

166

See Roosevelt, 877 P.2d at 823 (Feldman, J., concurring) (noting that the Art. XI, § 1
issue was very important); Kromko, 165 P.3d at 173 (noting that there were “judicially
discoverable and manageable standards” for resolving the issue in Roosevelt). See also
Cohen, supra note 157, at 58 (arguing that, despite the current political question doctrine,
the courts will still decide hard, politically salient cases when necessary).
167
Roosevelt, 877 P.2d at 823 (Feldman, J., concurring).
168
Id. at 816.
169
The political question doctrine, moreover, should not be applied in a way that would
insulate the Legislature from proper scrutiny or discourage political participation. Cohen,
supra note 157, at 5; see also STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (2005) (arguing that the
Constitution should be interpreted in a way that promotes democratic participation).
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VI. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED
A. Counterargument: Requiring 501(c)(4)s to Disclose Their Donors
Would Violate the Constitutional Principles Set Forth in NAACP
v. Alabama and McIntyre v. Ohio
1. Background
The courts have rightfully been wary of laws requiring political
disclosure. Throughout the twentieth century, the States employed dozens
of strategies in an effort to suppress the black vote.170 In 1927, for
example, the Court struck down a Texas law preventing black voters from
participating in primary elections.171 In 1944, the Court was forced to
strike down a “reenacted” version of this same Texas law.172 In 1953, the
Court held that Texas could not delegate its control over polling stations to
private, racially discriminatory organizations.173 Racially discriminatory
voting regulations such as these “infected the electoral process in parts of
[the] country for nearly a century.”174 This served as the backdrop for
NAACP v. Alabama.
In NAACP v. Alabama, the NAACP was charged with violating an
Alabama law requiring out-of-state corporations to “qualify” with the
Secretary of State before doing business in the state.175 During the
discovery process, the state served the NAACP with a subpoena, requesting
the names and addresses of all the association’s Alabama members.176
Compelled disclosure of this sort, the Court held, impermissibly curtailed
the members’s freedom of association.177 Requiring a revelation of
membership could likely lead to the sort of reprisals that would chill core
First Amendment activity, such as “loss of employment, threat[s] of
physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.”178 For this
reason, the state cannot compel the disclosure of an advocacy group’s
members.
The Court further extended this holding in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission, where the Court held that private citizens have a First
Amendment right to disseminate anonymous campaign literature.179 The
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179

See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 560 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927).
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 658 (1944).
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953).
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 451 (1958).
Id. at 453.
Id. at 462–63.
Id. at 462.
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
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state cannot indiscriminately outlaw anonymous speech, the Court held.180
To do so would chill the freedom of speech and would disallow
pamphleteers to express their ideas without “fear of retaliation.”181
2. NAACP and McIntyre Do Not Prevent States from Requiring
501(c)(4) Organizations to Disclose Their Donors’s
Identities.
Requiring 501(c)(4) organizations to disclose their political donors
would not run afoul of the First Amendment.182 In 2011, the federal
DISCLOSE Bill reached the House Floor.183 This Bill, which was
ultimately defeated, would have required 501(c)(4) organizations to
disclose their contributors if the organization made independent
expenditures
for
express
advocacy
or
electioneering
communications.184 By limiting disclosure requirements to only those
organizations that engage in overtly political activity, Congress likely
ensured this law was sufficiently tailored to withstand First Amendment
scrutiny.185 In fact, this Bill was tailored to conform with the Supreme
Court’s language in Citizens United, which endorsed such disclosure
requirements.186
Citizens United and its ilk demonstrate the Court’s encouragement of
these disclosure requirements.187 “It is undoubtedly true,” the Court stated
in Buckley, that certain disclosure requirements “will deter some
individuals” from engaging in expressive activity,188 but the courts have
consistently upheld disclosure requirements that are sufficiently tailored to
serve the government’s compelling interest in preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption in government.189 Any good disclosure law,
accordingly, would ensure it does not require more disclosure than
180

Id. at 357.
Id. at 343, 357.
182
See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt
Organizations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363, 401–06 (2011) (listing several
ways in which Congress could constitutionally require tax-exempt organizations to disclose
their political donors).
183
“DISCLOSE” was an acronym standing for Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting
Light On Spending in Elections. Despite having a cringe-worthy title, this Bill would have
been a very positive step toward reigning in dark money in federal elections.
184
Aprill, supra note 182, at 403.
185
Id. at 401–06.
186
See id. at 403.
187
Id. at 405.
188
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68.
189
See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1459–60 (2014); Citizens United,
558 U.S. at 366–71; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68.
181
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necessary. The Court has made clear that disclosure cannot be compelled
when doing so would cause the group to be subjected to unwanted
reprisals.190 A properly tailored law, therefore, should also include
exceptions for minor political parties and disfavored minority groups.191
In addition to the Court “signing-off” on political disclosure
requirements, scholars have also called for stricter disclosure requirements
from both the States and the federal government.192 Disclosure often makes
political
communications
more
informative
and
less
misleading.193 Disclosure prohibits nothing and assumes that people can
process information and make better choices if they have more
information. And the underlying appeal of disclosure is that it will produce
informed decisions by the public, whether as voters, donors, or
shareholders.194
B. Counterargument: Even If the Legislature Required 501(c)(4)s and
Other Dark Money Organizations to Disclose Their Donors, This
Still Would Not Enlighten the Electorate—Voters Would Not
Research Which Candidate was Financed by Which
Organization, and Even If They Did, the Vast Majority of Donors
Would be Unknown to the Voter195
There is no denying that this objection is—at least in some part—true.
The last thing on a mother’s mind as she picks her kids up from soccer
practice is who financed her State Senator’s last campaign—she does not
know, and she probably does not care. Most people do not have the time,
wherewithal, or inclination to look up campaign finance disclosures. But
reporters do.
This same argument could have been made to suppress the Pentagon
Papers—those documents were thousands of pages in length, and no
average person would have been able to comprehend those documents
without the aid of the reporters at the New York Times and the Washington
Post. Almost all-important political issues are too complicated and
190

Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm’n, 459 U.S. 87, 93 (1982) (citing
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74).
191
See Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021, 1031–35 (9th
Cir. 2009) (striking down a Montana law requiring the disclosure of de minimis in-kind
contributions).
192
Aprill, supra note 182, at 401–06; Roger Colinvaux, Political Activity Limits and
Tax Exemption: A Gordian’s Knot, 34 VA. TAX REV. 1, 47–49 (2014); see generally Sugin,
supra note 92.
193
Sugin, supra note 92, at 919.
194
Id. at 919–20.
195
See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures on Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 265–67
(2010).
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nuanced for the average person to understand without the help of
journalists. However, that is no reason to suppress the information. We
trust—at least we used to trust196—in our journalistic institutions to shed
light into these complicated political areas. We should continue to keep
this faith.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the early 1990s, Arizona’s public-school system was a disgrace.
Arizona had one of the lowest per-pupil spending rates, the lowest teacher
salaries, and some of the largest class sizes in the country. In 1994, the
Arizona Supreme Court decided Roosevelt v. Bishop, where the Court
required the Legislature to fulfill its constitutional obligation to “establish
minimum adequate facility standards and [to] provide funding to ensure
that no district falls below them.”197 In response to Roosevelt and its
progeny, the Legislature (1) substantially increased its funding of the public
school system; (2) created the School Facilities Board, and charged it with
developing minimum school facility adequacy guidelines; and (3) provided
the school districts with “soft” funds for the purchase of textbooks,
computers, school buses, and other equipment.
The time has come for the courts to require the State Legislature to
meet another one of its constitutional obligations: the obligation to
“provid[e] for a general publicity . . . of all campaign contributions . . . and
expenditures . . . .”198 To quote Justice Elena Kagan: “Arizonans deserve
better. Like citizens across this country, Arizonans deserve a government
that represents and serves them all. And no less, Arizonans deserve the
chance to reform their electoral system so as to attain that most American
of goals.”199 I agree.

196

See Art Swift, Americans’ Trust in Mass Media Sinks to New Low, GALLUP, Sept.
14, 2016 (finding that less than one-third of Americans have “a fair amount” of trust in the
media), available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/195542/americans-trust-mass-media-sinksnew-low.aspxhttp://www.gallup.com/poll/195542/americans-trust-mass-media-sinks-newlow.aspx.
197
Hull v. Albrecht, 960 P.2d 634, 637 (Ariz. 1998) (Albrecht II).
198
Ariz. Const. art VII, § 16.
199
Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 785 (2011)
(Kagan, J., dissenting).

